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Book Review

Civilizing Religion
A

REVIEW OF RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PER-

SPECTIVES by Michael J. Perry.* New York, NY: Oxford University
Press 1997. Pp.168.
Kurt T. Lash**

Is it appropriate to restrict abortion at any stage in pregnancy on the
ground that human life is sacred? Should the public square be open to biblical arguments against homosexuality? Or, to frame the issue in a more scholarly fashion: What role may religious arguments play, if any, either in public
debate about what political choices to make or as the private basis of a political choice? In his recent book, Religion in Politics: Constitutionaland Moral
Perspectives,1 Michael Perry addresses these questions as a matter of constitutional law and political morality. Perry has been down this road before,
most notably in his 1991 book, Love and Power.2 This new effort represents
both a response to scholarly criticism of Love and Power and a reflection of
Perry's "rethinking" the problem of religion in politics. 3 Ultimately, Perry
Howard J. Trienens Chair in Law, Northwestern University.
Professor of Law and W. Joseph Ford Fellow, Loyola of Los Angeles Law School. The
author thanks Larry Solum for his insights and advice. All errors and omissions, of course, are
my own.
1 MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CoNsTrrTIONAL AND MORA. PERSPECTrVES (1997)
2 MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALrr IN
*

**

AMERICAN POLrrICS (1991).
3 See PERRY, supra note 1. In his forward to Religion in Politics,Perry writes:
In the years since Love and Power was published, and partly in response to critical
August 1997 Vol. 65 No. 6
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concludes that religious-based political advocacy is always constitutional, and
usually moral as well. This distinguishes Perry from the more exclusionary
theories of scholars like Robert Audi4 and Richard Rorty5 who would se-6
verely restrict the religious voice in political debate, or remove it altogether.
Perry draws the line, however, when it comes to relying on religious arguments regarding human well-being (what must-or must not-be done in order for humans to flourish): these religious arguments (for example,
arguments against homosexual sexual conduct) are not an appropriate basis
for making a political choice unless that choice is also supported by a persuasive secular rationale. 7 Thus, Perry stakes out a position somewhere between
unfettered inclusion and complete exclusion of religious arguments from
political debate and decisionmaking. 8 In the process, Perry provides the
reader with a nuanced and reasonable approach to a rather complicated set
of issues. In fact, Perry's approach may be too nuanced and too reasonable:
his constitutional and moral theories contain important caveats that are difficult to reconcile with his overarching principles. Also, Perry's vision of reasonable religious dialogue seems but a shadow of the impassioned rhetoric
that characterized the historic speeches of the religious abolitionists and currently pervades the debates over abortion and homosexuality-Perry's paradigmatic instances of moral debates. In his attempt to civilize religion, Perry
may have excised those arguments that are distinctively religious on subjects
commentary on Love and Power, I have continued to think about the difficult problem of religion in politics. As it happens, my thinking has been a rethinking.
Among the inquiries I pursue in this book are two that I neglected to pursue in
Love and Power. first, the question of the constitutionality, under the nonestablishment norm, of religious argument in politics; second, the question of the relationship between religiously based moral arguments and secular moral arguments.
Id. at 5; see also Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and PoliticalChoice: FurtherThoughtsAnd Second Thoughts-On Love and Power, 30 SAN DiEao L. REV. 703 (1993) (addressing the
role of religious morality in political choice).
4 See Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligationsof Citizenship,
18 PHIL. & PUB. As'. 259, 284 (1989) ("One should not advocate or promote any legal or public
policy restrictions on human conduct unless one not only has and is willing to offer, but is also
motivated by, adequate secular reason.").
5 See Richard Rorty, Religion as a Conversation Stopper, 3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1, 2
(1994) (arguing that we should make it seem "bad taste to bring religion into discussions of
public policy"); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JuSTICE IN THE LmERAL STATE 10-11
(1980) (arguing that political decisions should not rest on claims that one conception of the good
is better than others).
6 Other recent and important works in this area include KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE
CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995), and JOHN RAwLs, POLrICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
Law review articles on this subject are voluminous. See, e.g., Symposium, The Religious Voice in
the Public Square, 29 Loy. L. REv. 1401 (1996); Symposium, The Role of Religion in Public
Debate in a Liberal Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 643 (1993).
7 Perry distinguishes religious arguments regarding human worth (for example, "are all
human beings equal?") from religious arguments regarding human well-being (for example, laws
regulating homosexual sexual activity). Perry restricts reliance on the latter, not the former, as a
basis for making a political choice. See discussion infra Parts II.A., II.B.
8 In fact, Perry describes himself as standing between two worlds: He writes as a Catholic
Christian "thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council," yet sees himself as
"one who stands between all religious nonbelievers on the one side and many religious believers-especially theologically conservative believers-on the other." PEmY, supra note 1, at 7.
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of critical concern to many religious believers. These, however, are but minor criticisms. Religion in Politics is a thoughtful and important addition to
Perry's previous work on the religious voice in the public square and it deserves a careful reading by anyone interested in the subject.
L

Religious Arguments and the Constitution

In the first half of his book, Perry addresses the Constitution of the
United States and presents what he believes the Free Exercise and Establish-

ment Clauses "correctly understood, forbid government to do."9 Essentially,
Perry believes the First Amendment requires the government to remain neutral on the subject of religion.' 0 For example, the Free Exercise Clause forbids government from discriminating against religious practice disfavoring

religious practice as such." On the other hand, the Establishment Clause
forbids government from favoring one or more religions as such. 12 Under
this interpretation, the religion clauses function as two sides of the same coin;
one side forbidding intentional government suppression of religion, the other
side forbidding intentional government support of religion.1 3 To this general
principle, however, Perry adds an important exception it is likely that the

Free Exercise Clause, correctly understood, requires accommodation of religion where doing so does not seriously threaten an important governmental
interest.14 Thus, Perry's general theory of the religion clauses includes a pro-

viso; government may not benefit religion as religion, 5 "unless (a) the benefit is in the form of an exemption from an otherwise applicable ban or other
regulatory restraint that would substantially burden the practice and (b) the
16
exemption does not seriously compromise an important public interest.'

9 Id. at 20.
10 See id. at 9 ("The heart of my account of the free exercise and nonestablishment norms
is that government may not make judgments about the value or disvalue-the truth value, the
moral value, the social value, any kind of value-of religions or religious practices or religious
(theological) tenets.").
11 See id. at 13.
12 See id. at 14.
13 Professor Douglas Laycock calls this approach formal neutrality: incidental aid or interference with religion is permissible as long as the government refrains from intentionally supporting or suppressing religion. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 999 (1990).
14 See PERRY, supra note 1, at 14 (arguing that the nondiscrimination position outlined
above is only the least controversial interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause). For historical
evidence in support of the accommodation position, see generally Kurt T. Lash, The Second
Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the FourteenthAmendment,
88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1106 (1994) (arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment anticipated mandated accommodation), and Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409 (1990) (arguing that the
framers of the original Constitution anticipated mandated accommodation of religion).
15 Or, as Perry puts it, "government may not confer on persons because they engage in a
particular religious practice, a benefit it would otherwise deny to them, if doing so is based on
the view that the practice, is, as religious practice, better than one or more other religious or
nonreligious practices or than no religious practice at all." PERRY, supra note 1, at 30.
16 Id. at 30.
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Perry claims that his interpretation of the religion clauses generally
tracks the Supreme Court's current approach to free exercise and "substantially represents the position of the Court today" on the Establishment
Clause. 17 Here, Perry may be indulging in a bit of wishful thinking.
Although adoption of Perry's nonestablishment norm would (in my opinion)
improve and clarify much of the Supreme Court's establishment jurisprudence, the result would be a substantial departure from the Court's current
approach to a number of church-state controversies. For example, in his discussion of government displays of religious symbols, Perry distinguishes between the government's use of religious symbols and private religious
displays in otherwise open public forums.' 8 Under Perry's theory, truly private displays would be per se constitutional because they do not involve a
government decision to favor or value one religion over other religions or
nonreligion. 19 Even government sponsored religious displays are unconstitutional "only if, the display is based on the view that one or more religions (or
religious practices or tenets) are, as such, better than one or more other religions or than no religion at all."' 20 This kind of formal government neutrality
approach to the equal protection clause has been rejected by at least five
members of the current court: Justices O'Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer have each authored or joined opinions that interpret the Establishment Clause to apply in situations involving private religious speech that
conveys-intentionally or not-a message of government endorsement of
religion.2 1 However preferable Perry's neutrality standard might be as a test
for public religious displays (and I believe it is), that standard has not yet
been adopted by a majority of the current Court.
Adoption of Perry's nonestablishment norm would have the greatest impact on the convoluted line of cases involving government aid to religiously
affiliated schools. According to Perry, "the government may give financial
Id. at 20.
18 See id at 21 & n.40.
19 See id. (citing Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2450
17

(1995)). Indeed, treating private speech differently would violate Perry's free exercise norm.

See id. at 13 ("[T]he free exercise norm is an antidiscrimination provision: It forbids government
to take prohibitory action discriminating against religious practice (i.e., disfavoring religious
practice as such)."); see also Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2450 (finding that the Establishment Clause
does not apply in cases involving truly private speech in truly public forums).
20

PERY, supra note

1, at 21 (arguing that when the government includes secular symbols

of the season alongside religious symbols like a Christmas tree or a menorah, "it seems likely
that such a scene would be displayed on the basis of the view that all the major symbols of the
season ... should brighten the town square and contribute.., to the festive, generous spirit of
the holiday" and not on the basis that Christianity or Judaism are, as religions, better than other

religions).
21 See Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2453 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our prior cases do not imply
that the endorsement test has no place where private religious speech in a public forum is at

issue."); see also Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2528 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (declining to limit the restrictions of the Establishment Clause to no more than a
requirement that the government neutrally fund both religious and nonreligious speech); id. 115
S. Ct. 2541 (Souter, J., dissenting) (opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer)

("Evenhandedness is therefore a prerequisite to further enquiry into the constitutionality of a
doubtful law, but evenhandedness goes no further. It does not guarantee success under Establishment Clause scrutiny.").
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aid to religiously affiliated schools-including elementary and secondary
schools... if, and only if, first, the criteria for such aid are religiously neutral
and, second, the aid program is not a subterfuge for affirming one or more
religions as such." 22 This approach tracks recent decisions by the Supreme
24
3
Court involving indirect aid to religious organizations3 As of this writing,
however, direct aid to religious elementary and secondary schools continues
to be analyzed under the so-called Lemon testy2 which forbids government
from granting religious educational institutions equal opportunity with secular organizations to participate in government funding programs. 26 I believe
that adoption of Perry's nondiscrimination principle would be a vast improvement over the test formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and that it is the
most plausible reading of the incorporated Establishment Clause.27 Nevertheless, adoption of the nonestablishment norm would do far more than
merely reverse Lemon;28 it would make the Lemon test itself unconstitutional. Excluding otherwise eligible religious groups from participation in
government benefits programs would violate "the free exercise side" of
Perry's nondiscrimination principle. 29 Perry comes close to acknowledging
this, but seems reluctant to concede the full implications of his theory.30 Nevsupra note 1, at 23.
See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1993) (holding that a
school district did not violate the Establishment Clause by furnishing a deaf student attending
Catholic high school with a sign language interpreter because the government program was generally applicable and attending parochial school was the result of a purely private choice); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485-90 (1986) (upholding
government vocational assistance to an individual attending a religious college).
24 Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states may implement remedial and supplementary educational programs by placing teachers in private religious schools without violating the Establishment Clause. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997). Agostini reversed
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), which had barred such aid under the test developed in
22 PERRY,
23

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (1971) (holding that under the Establishment Clause,
government action must have a secular purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religious exercise, and must not create impermissible entanglements between government
and religion).
26 Perry describes Lemon's progeny, with some reason, as an "unholy mess." See PERRY,

supra note 1, at 23; see also JESSE H.

CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 174-76 (1995).
27 I believe that it is unlikely that the framers of the First or Fourteenth

Amendments
considered neutrally provided government aid to be an establishment of religion. See Lash,
supra note 14, at 1151.
28 See supra note 26.
29 In other words, not only is Lemon wrong, it is itself unconstitutional in the sense that it
requires something Perry believes the Free Exercise Clause forbids.
30 See PERRY, supra note 1, at 24 ("That government may not discriminate in favor of
religious activities does not entail that government must discriminate against them. I cannot
imagine why, as a matter of political morality, one would want to require government to discriminate against religious activities-or, therefore, why one would want to construe the nonestablishment norm to require such discrimination. (Indeed, I cannot imagine why one would want to
permit government to discriminate against religious activities.)"). Perry also notes that "[g]iven
the extent to which the citizenry of the United States is religious, it seems perverse to suggest
that the nonestablishment norm should be construed not only to forbid government to discriminate in favor of religious activities, but also to require government to discriminate against such
activities." Id.
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ertheless, the conclusion seems inescapable: adoption of the nondiscrimination norm would not only flip Lemon on its head (shifting the rule from
mandated exclusion to forbidden exclusion), it would also require striking
down a number of state constitutional provisions that forbid the use of state
funds by religious or "sectarian" institutions, even as part of a general gov3
ernment benefits program. '
A. Accommodation of Religion
Having set up the nondiscrimination principle as the core value of the
religion clauses, Perry then adds an important caveat. Although the Free
Exercise Clause at least prohibits discrimination, the clause conceivably also
requires affirmative accommodation of religion. As Perry puts it, the free
exercise norm might require "government to maximize the space for religious
practice by exempting religious practice from an otherwise applicable ban or
other regulatory restraint that would interfere substantially with a person's
ability to engage in the practice, unless the exemption would seriously compromise an important public interest. '3 2 Perry thus disagrees with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause set forth in Employment Division v. Smith, 33 in which the Court held that, although accommodation of religion might be permitted, it is not constitutionally required.
Perry also supports Congress's effort to restore pre-Smith protection of religion from generally applicable laws through the enactment of the Religious
34
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA").
Accommodation mandates special treatment for religiously motivated
conduct-conduct that would not be accommodated if motivated by secular
beliefs. Perry acknowledges that special accommodation of religion is in tension with what he earlier referred to as the core establishment (and free exercise) principle of nondiscrimination. 35 Nevertheless, Perry argues that the
31 See, e.g., WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 11 ("No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment."). For the anti-Roman Catholic history behind many such clauses see Lash,
supra note 14, at 1122-25.
32 PERRY, supra note 1, at 25. For example, a general ban on the consumption of alcohol

would have to exempt consumption of wine in the Christian sacrament of the Eucharist. See id.
33 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
34 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). When this review was written, the Supreme Court had just
granted certiorari to address the constitutionality of the RFRA. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73
F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996). The Supreme Court recently struck
down that aspect of the RFRA that applied against the state. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 2157 (1997). Although presumably, RFRA remains in effect as applied against the federal
government, the Supreme Court may soon address this issue as well. See Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997) (mem.), vacatingand remandingIn re Young, 82
F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that RFRA precludes bankruptcy court from requiring a

church to turn over contributions made by a debtor).
35 See PERRY, supra note 1, at 28-29 ("The principle argument against the accommodation
position is that for government to do what the accommodation position requires-favor, by ac-

commodating, religious practice as such-is for government, in violation of the nonestablishment norm, to take action based on the view that, at least as a general matter, religious practices

are, as such, better or more valuable than nonreligious practices."). Perry implies that the more
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nonestablishment
norm is not violated by limiting accommodation to reli36
gious exercise:
[B]ecause the free exercise norm (as a bedrock part of the existing
constitutional law of the United States) operates as a practical limit
on what we can reasonably construe the nonestablishment norm to
forbid, it is not inconsistent with the nonestablishment norm for
constitutional law to protect only acts of religious conscience from
37
discrimination against them.
By referring to the free exercise norm as a "bedrock part" 38 of constitutional law, Perry means that "'We the People of the United States' now living" 39 support the application of the Free Exercise Clause against both the
states and the federal government, whatever the original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 0 Although Perry seems correct that the
incorporated Free Exercise Clause acts as a "practical limit" on our understanding of the incorporated Establishment Clause, it is not altogether clear
how incorporation leads to the principle of accommodation. Perry might be
arguing that once we accept the principle of an incorporated Free Exercise
Clause, then because that clause itself favors religious (and not secular) exercise, it is not inconsistent to accommodate only the religious (but not the
secular) conscience. This is true, however, only if the best reading of the
incorporated Free Exercise Clause is one that requires favoring religion over
nonreligion. But this is not the only way to read the clause. As Perry himself
points out, the least controversial interpretation of free exercise is "freedom
from discrimination": neither one nor all religions may be treated worse than
some religions or nonreligion. 4' Even though religious exercise as a class is
singled out for special protection, this might mean nothing more than that the
government (state or federal) must not discriminate against this particular
class. True, this approach would provide religion "special treatment" (as suspect classes are provided "special treatment" under the Equal Protection
Clause), but it would not necessarily require providing religiously motivated
conduct an "accommodation" from otherwise generally applicable law (any
more than "special treatment" of suspect classes under the Equal Protection
42
Clause necessarily implies affirmative action).
just approach might be to accommodate both the secular and the religious conscience wherever
possible. See id. at 29-30.
36 Perry does not distinguish between permissive and mandated accommodation, though
he apparently believes that permissive accommodation-accommodation not mandated by the
Free Exercise Clause-does not violate the nonestablishment norm. See id. at 27-28 & n.63. For
example, Perry is persuaded that the RFRA-a nonmandated government accommodation of
religion-is constitutional. Even if accommodation of religion mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause can be reconciled with Perry's fundamental principle of nondiscrimination (something I
am not persuaded of), it seems especially difficult to reconcile nonmandated accommodation of
religion with the principle that, generally, religion may not be granted favored status in law.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 29.
39 Id. at 27.
40 See id. at 29.
41 See id. at 14.
42 Obviously, the best reading of the Equal Protection Clause may allow-and even, in
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My point is not that I think Perry is incorrect about accommodation. In
fact, I agree with him that the best reading of the incorporated Free Exercise
43
Clause includes the possibility of mandated accommodation of religion.
Such a reading, however, is not required by the text of the original clause, or
by its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. Accommodation must
be derived from a principle that informs the meaning of the text: either its
original meaning, or its meaning at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, accepting accommodation as an aspect of
free exercise implies that this clause is informed by a very different norm
than that of the Establishment Clause.44 In fact, if Perry is right about the
best reading of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses (and I believe
he is), then we would expect the jurisprudence that flows from each of the
two clauses to be "asymmetrical"-for example, courts might require nothing
more than government neutrality when it comes to the advancement of religion, but occasionally require (or at least permit) special accommodation of
religion when it comes to lifting government-imposed burdens on religious
exercise. In other words, accommodation of religion is not an exception from
a general principle, it is a separate and distinct principle of religious liberty.
Perry's discussion of religious accommodation, of course, is somewhat
removed from his main point regarding religious participation in politics.
Nevertheless, by opening the door to accommodation, especially permissive
accommodation, 45 Perry undermines a point essential to his theory regarding
the morality of religious arguments in support of public policy choices; that
religious based policy choices regarding human well-being are fundamentally
at odds with both the Constitution and political morality unless supported by
a plausible secular rationale. Perry believes that accommodation of religion
46
violates neither the Constitution nor any principle of political morality.
But, if this is so-if it is permissible for government to enact a law that grants
religion as religion a special and preferred status in law-then it is hard to
understand why it is less moral to grant religious based reasons equal status
with secular rationales in making policy choices.
B. Applying ConstitutionalPrinciplesto the Use of, and Reliance on,
Religious Arguments in Politics
Perry next applies his constitutional theory to the role of religious arguments in public debate and political decisionmaking. 47 In terms of public del
some circumstances, mandate-affirmative action. My point is that to arrive at this conclusion,
however, one must do more than simply assert that the text demands such a reading.
43 See Lash, supra note 14, at 1149-52.
44 Perry rejects an interpretation of the Establishment Clause that would require discrimination against religion. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 24.
45 See id at 28 n.63 (arguing that RFRA is constitutional).
46 See id. at 30 (arguing that even if it would be morally preferable that both religious and
secular consciences be accommodated where possible, accommodation of religion alone cannot
be considered morally obnoxious).
47 By "religious" argument, Perry means:
[A]n argument that relies on (among other things) a religious belief: an argument
that presupposes the truth of a religious belief and includes that belief as one of its
essential premises. A "religious" belief is, for present purposes, either the belief
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bate, disfavoring private religious arguments-even religious arguments that

could not themselves serve as a basis for political choice48-would violate the
antidiscrimination norm of the Free Exercise Clause. 49 Therefore, according
to Perry, the only "serious question ...is whether government would violate

the nonestablishment norm by basing a political choice-for example, a law
banning abortion-on a religious argument." 50
Perry argues that if government wants to make a political choice, includ-

ing one about the morality of human conduct, it may do so only on the basis
of a secular argument-"an argument that relies neither on any religious belief nor on the belief that God does not exist .,,51
The nonestablishment norm

forbids government from acting on the basis that one or more religious tenets
are closer to the truth or more valuable than competing religious or nonreligious tenets. Making a coercive political choice unsupportable on any but

religious grounds would amount to coerced compliance with God's willsolely because it is God's will. 52 Although requiring a secular rationale favors
policy choices based on "secular morality" over those based on religious morality, Perry believes that the rule in operation will have little effect on public
policy choices.5 3 Most often, there are plausible religious and secular reasons
for any political choice that government might want to make, and judicial
review would be limited to determining only whether the secular rationale is
54
plausible.
There is evidence that, by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, most
state courts embraced the idea that, generally, the exercise of coercive state
power required a secular rationale, and that this requirement was likely considered to be one of the privileges or immunities of United States citizens.55
that God exists-"God" in the sense of a transcendent reality that is the source, the
ground, and the end of everything else-or a belief about the nature, the activity,
or the will of God.
Id. at 31.
48 For example, persons of nonwhite ancestry are not truly or fully human.
49 According to Perry, "[e]very citizen, without regard to whether she is a legislator or
other public official, is constitutionally free to present in public political debate whatever arguments about morality, including whatever religious arguments, she wants to present." PERRY,
supra note 1, at 32. Perry notes that different rules apply when dealing with the speech of government employees. See id. at 32 n.84.
50 Id. at 33.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 36.
53 See id.
54 See id. at 36-37. Theoretically, Perry's approach would require religious believers to
make all their political choices on the basis of a sufficient secular rationale-a requirement difficult to police. Perry concedes that it is difficult to discern whether a legislator would have made
a political choice in the absence of a religious belief-indeed, sometimes the legislator herself
might not know. See id. at 34. Nevertheless, Perry insists that the religious legislator should only
vote in favor of the law if she is convinced the secular rationale is independently persuasive. See
id. at 37. "That she cannot reach a judgment about the soundness of the relevant secular argument or arguments on her own is not disabling, because she can seek the help of those whose
judgment she respects and trusts." Id.
55 See Lash, supra note 14, at 1100-18 (discussing the shift from religious to secular rationales for blasphemy laws, Sunday closing laws, and judicial resolution of church property
disputes).
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Perry also seems correct to suggest that, as a general matter, there are plausible secular and religious grounds for most policy initiatives. If judicial review
were truly limited to a deferential consideration of whether there is a "plausible secular rationale" in addition to a religious rationale, the requirement
would affect few policy initiatives. Courts, however, have not always been so
deferential towards secular rationales offered in support of policy choices vigorously advocated by religious groups; for example, secular rationales advanced for requiring "equal time" for the teaching of both evolution and
creation science.5 6 Indeed, Perry himself rejects as implausible secular arguments against homosexual sexual conduct 57-a matter of particular concern
to conservative religious groups. The potential for discounting plausible secular arguments looms especially large when one considers some of the most
divisive "morality" issues facing courts today (e.g., abortion, assisted suicide)
and likely to face courts tomorrow (genetic engineering, cloning, etc.). To
the extent that religious organizations engage in public advocacy on these
matters, they increase the risk that courts will discount plausible secular justifications for regulation and hold that one or another political choice is "really" a religious-based policy choice.
But even if we could guarantee that courts would invalidate only those
actions based solely on a religious premise, does the Constitution require invalidation of all laws lacking a persuasive secular rationale? Perhaps surprisingly, Perry does not think so. The general rule, once again, has a caveat: the
constitutional requirement that religious arguments be supportable by plausible secular rationales does not apply to religious arguments regarding human
worth (for example, the claim that each and every human being is sacred).5 8
Although Perry develops this exception further in the next section of his
book,5 9 he never explains why this religious belief, but not others, constitutionally may be imposed on nonbelievers.60 Also, although Perry will argue
that the sacred nature of every human is almost universally acknowledged as
a core aspect of human rights, he never spells out why political choices based
56 See PERRY, supra note 1, at 22 (discussing regulation of the teaching of evolution and
creation science). Perry notes that the dissent in Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578, 631 (1987),
raised a serious question whether the equal-time statute in that case was based not on religious
beliefs, but was intended to protect students' freedom to decide the matter for themselves. See
PERRY, supra note 1, at 22.

57 See PERRY, supra note 1, at 37 (indicating that state denial of gay marriage "probably
violates the antidiscrimination part of the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also id. at 85-96 (discussing John Finnis's secular arguments against the morality of homosexual sexual conduct).
Perry ultimately rejects Fmnis's arguments as unconvincing and concludes that "[i]n the wake of
Finnis's failure, one can fairly doubt that any secular argument that all homosexual sexual conduct is immoral is sound." Id. at 96. If there is no plausible secular argument, then, according to
Perry's theory, there is no longer a justification for relying on any religious argument reaching
the same conclusion.
58 See id. at 35.
59 See infra Part II.B.
60 In the second half of his book, Perry discusses the morality of religious arguments regarding human worth, focusing in particular on the near universal acceptance of the principle of
equal human worth. See infra Part II.B. This argument, of course, does not make the imposition
of that belief constitutional any more than near universal belief in some form of deity would
make imposition of that belief constitutional.
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on a "universally accepted religious principle" escape the restrictions of the
Establishment Clause. It is possible, of course, to argue that the proposition
that "all human life is sacred" is not a religious proposition at all, 61 and thus
evades the restrictions of the Establishment Clause. Perry, however, believes
that this is a religious proposition-and once again the reader is left grappling with a fundamental principle undermined by a "caveat" to the general

rule.
1H. Religious Arguments in Public Political Debate
In the second half of his book, Perry moves from issues of constitutional
law to considerations of political morality. Because it is inevitable that both

religious citizens and religious legislators will place some weight on religious
arguments in voting for political choices on the morality of human conduct,
he believes that it is better to bring such arguments out into the open "so that
they may be tested in public political debate." 62 Religious arguments should
be encouraged to participate in a kind of ecumenical political dialogue in
which all sides benefit from hearing the perspective of the other. 63 Perry thus

rejects the view that religious believers are unable to engage meaningfully in
deliberative debate. 64 Although he concedes that some religious believers are

unable to gain the critical distance from their fundamental religious beliefs
necessary for such deliberation, Perry points out that this is just as true for
some advocates of secular fundamental beliefs. 65 Moreover, even sectarian
61 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 25 (1993) (arguing that "sacred" can be used in a
secular as well as a theistic sense).
62 PERRY, supra note 1, at 45. Perry disagrees with Kent Greenawalt who has argued that
religious arguments by private citizens should be distinguished from those made by legislators.
See id. at 49-54. According to Greenawalt, legislators should not present religious arguments in
public political debate. See GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 156-58. Greenawalt believes that to
do so would cause some of those the legislator represents to "feel imposed upon in the sense of
being excluded" and, by asserting privileged knowledge unavailable to the nonbeliever, imply an
"inequality of status that is in serious tension with the fundamental idea of equality of citizens
within liberal democracies." Id. at 157. Perry's response is that any resulting feelings of exclusion are no different than the feelings of exclusion that arise when one disagrees with one's
representative on secular matters. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 50-53. Similarly, the assertion of
"privileged knowledge" is also true for many speakers on secular subjects, and, in any event,
assertion of privileged knowledge is not "inconsistent with the fundamental idea of the equality
of all citizens." Id. at 51. According to Perry, fundamental equality does not require that all
citizens share the same religious or secular views, nor does it imply that all citizens' ideas are
equally correct. Representing all constituents does not mean acting on grounds all of them agree
with, but acting according to what the legislator believes is in everyone's best interests-including controversial ideas that the legislator believes are "truly good for every member of the community." Id. at 51. Perry's fundamental point is that, in a liberal democratic society, truthful
disclosure of why the representative voted the way she did "is an overriding, if infrequently
honored, value." Id. at 52. The best approach, to Perry, is for all reasons to be considered, acted
upon, and disclosed. Even if this creates some risk of political division along religious lines,
Perry believes there is little risk of reproducing on American soil the religious wars of earlier
centuries. See id. at 52-53.
63 PERRY, supra note 1, at 46-47.
64 Id.

65 "[Alt its best, religious discourse in public culture is not less dialogic-not less openminded, not less deliberative-than, at its best, secular discourse in public culture." Id. at 46-47
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discourse can make a worthwhile contribution to public deliberation about
difficult moral issues. 66 As Jeremy Waldron has argued, there is no good
reason to reduce political discourse to its least controversial components:
Even if people are exposed in argument to ideas over which they
are bound to disagree-and how could any doctrine of public deliberation preclude that?-it does not follow that such exposure is
pointless or oppressive. For one thing, it is important for people to
be acquainted with the views that others hold. Even more important however, is the possibility that my own view may be improved,
in its subtlety and depth, by exposure to a religion or a metaphysics
that I am initially inclined to reject. 67
If a citizen is able to justify a political choice on grounds that she believes other citizens reasonably could accept-and she is prepared to defend
those choices on those grounds-obviously, she should do SO. 6 8 Morally (and
strategically 69) she is better off using reasons that unite, rather than divide.
This alternative, however, may not always be possible. The relevant premises
that she believes other citizens might reasonably accept may be indeterminate or "underdetermined" in the sense that they might be inconclusive with
regard to the political choice at hand. For example, Perry believes that "publicly accessible" rationales are particularly underdeterminate with respect to
the abortion controversy.70 Caught between the two goals of protecting "the
great worth of human life and the full and therefore equal humanity of woit becomes necessary to proceed on the
men," in order to reach a conclusion
71
basis of some nonpublic reason.
In addition to the problem of "underdeterminate" secular rationales,
there is also the problem of insufficient secular rationales: What if the secular premises other persons might reasonably accept are insufficient to justify
the choice the believer is convinced is in the best interest of all? John Rawls
argues that, under the "liberal principle of legitimacy," the use of coercive
power must be justifiable to others if they are to be treated as "free and equal
citizens." 72 Perry, however, calls this restriction question begging:
(citing David Hollenbach's work regarding "ecumenical or inter-religious dialogue" among communities of faith).
66 See id- at 48.
67 Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributionsin Public Deliberation,30 SAN DIEGO L. REv.

817, 841-42 (1993); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1459
(critiquing Waldron's critique of Rawls's ideal of public reason).
68 PERRY, supra note 1, at 57.
69 See id- In other words, Perry's argument has to do with political morality, not political
strategy. See id. at 44.

70 See id. at 60.
71 Id. Perry goes on to state that "[r]eliance partly on a nonpublic reason or reasons,
whether religious or secular, is necessary for those on the 'pro-choice' side of the debate no less
than for those on the 'pro-life' side: for example, 'A human fetus is not a "person" and therefore
does not have the rights that persons have."' Id. at 61.
72 Id. at 59. Rawls limits this reasoning to debates regarding "constitutional essentials,"

and applies the restriction only to religious arguments unaccompanied by public reasons given in
due course. See RAWLS, PoLITICAL LIBERALISM at li-liii (1993).
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It remains obscure why we do not show others the respect that is
their due as human beings-or, at least, as "free and equal citizens"-when we offer them, in explanation, what we take to be our
true and best reasons for acting as we do (so long as our reasons do
not themselves assert, imply, or presuppose the inferior humanity of
73
those to whom the explanation is offered).
Perry points out that one of the historical roles of the religious voice in
political debate has been to challenge fundamental cultural assumptions. 74
Accordingly, it makes no sense to require religious believers to balance "social unity" against, say, the cost of destroying innocent human life. 75 Instead,
Perry proposes a "middle position":
[I]n the interest of promoting social unity, of cultivating rather than
subverting the bonds of political community, we try to justify political choices we want to make, as much as possible, on the basis of
political "ideals, principles and values that we may reasonably suppose all citizens could accept"-but according to which we do not
invariablylet the inability of a political choice to be justified on such
a basis preclude us from making the choice, or from publicly supporting it, on the basis of what we take to be our best reasons, even
if, alas, they are what Rawls terms "nonpublic"... 76
In the end, Perry believes that the risk of serious social consequences
posed by public religious arguments are "exaggerated," and outweighed by
the value of public airing (and testing) of religious views, and also by the
value to both the individual and the community of hearing the true and best
reason for the policy choice advocated by the individual. For Perry, "[iut is
not that religious convictions are brought to bear in public political debate
'77
that should worry us, but how they are sometimes brought to bear.
A.

Religious Arguments as a Basis for Political Choice

Having established the morality of public religious arguments in favor of
particular public policies, Perry next explores rules that he believes should
govern reliance on such arguments in making a political decision. He begins
73 PERRY, supra note 1, at 58; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Constructingan Ideal of Public
Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729, 750 (1993) (arguing that even if full respect for citizens as
"free and equal" requires giving only public reasons for a political choice, "given the fact of
pluralism we cannot attain completely the ideal of full respect" and should, instead, include the
nonpublic reasons for our choices). Perry appears to reject this reasoning, however, when it
comes to religious arguments regarding human well-being that are not also supported by plausible secular reasons. See infra Part II.C.
74 See PERRY, supra note 1, at 59 ("'[I]t is ...important for [religious groups in a pluralist

society] to retain a certain transcendence in relation to any specific constitutional system, a transcendence which will enable them to protest the atrocities and idolatries of which states have
always been
Response to
75 See
76 See

capable."') (quoting John Langan, SJ, Overcoming the Divisiveness of Religion: A
Paul J. Weithman, 22 J.RELIGIOUS ETHIcs 47, 51 (1994)).
id. at 59-60.
id. at 60.

77 Id. at 49. Perry adds that we should be "no less worried about how fundamental secular
convictions are sometimes brought to bear in public political debate." Id.
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by distinguishing religious arguments regarding human worth from religious
arguments regarding human well-being. Arguments regarding human worth
fall along the lines of "are all human beings sacred, or only some? Who is
truly and fully human? Women? Nonwhites? Jews? ' 78 Arguments regarding
human well-being, on the other hand, are those most often associated with
debates over public morals-for example, whether homosexual sexual conduct should be criminalized. The distinction for Perry is crucial: "[N]either
legislators nor other public officials should rely on a religious argument about
the requirements of human well-being unless an independent secular argument reaches the same conclusion about the requirements of human wellbeing. ' 79 On the other hand, citizens and legislators may rely on a religious
argument that every human being is sacred (a human worth argument)
"whether or not any intelligible or persuasive or even plausible secular argument supports the claim about the sacredness of every human being."80
B. Religious Arguments Regarding Human Worth
Human worth arguments are those based on the belief that "each and
every human being is sacred," 8' or, put less theologically, that "every person
[has] some sort of equal status."8 2 Perry claims that the proposition "all
human life is sacred" is essentially a religious claim-as are all arguments
based upon that proposition.8 3 Nevertheless, because of the near universal
acceptance of this norm,84 and because this norm plays a role in foundational
American political documents like the Declaration of Independence ("all
men are created equal"), it would be "silly" to insist that such arguments be
excluded unless accompanied by plausible secular rationales. 85
At the risk of being silly, however, it remains obscure to me why near
universal acceptance of an argument removes that argument from a general
requirement of political morality.8 6 No doubt, Perry is correct that the argument regarding the sacred nature of human life is reflected in many of our
legal institutions and that, today, relying on such a principle "do[es] not...
78

Id. at 66.

79

Id.

80 Id. at 69; cf Kent Greenawalt, Religious Expression in the Public Square-The Building
Blocks for an Intermediate Position,29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1411, 1414 (expressing skepticism for
arguments based on a distinction between "deep fundamental religious assumptions, such as that
God loves all human beings equally" and arguments based on "narrower, more specific religious
grounds" on the grounds that it is difficult to come up with a satisfactory division, and question-

ing whether "such a division is appropriate in our society").
81 PERRY, supra note 1, at 68.
82 Id. (quoting JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL
IMPORTANCE 239 (1987)).
83 See id. at 69. Perry rejects Ronald Dworkin's claim that the proposition "all human life
is sacred" is meaningful in secular as well as religious terms. See Michael J. Perry, The Gospel
According to Dworkin, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 163, 176 (1994).
84 Perry points out that arguments regarding the sacred nature of all humans are common
in international human rights declarations, and almost universally considered a fundamental aspect of any moral system. PERRY, supra note 1, at 66-67.
85 Id. at 69.
86 The near universal acceptance of human slavery at various points in world history would
not, one presumes, make that practice moral, either then or now.
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privilege either one religion (as such) over another or even religion over
nonreligion. ' '87 In 1860, however, the principle was impliedly rejected by the
United States Constitution,88 and expressly rejected by legal regimes in the
southern states. In fact, relying on such a principle as a basis for a political
choice at that time would have favored one religion (Christian abolitionists
and their interpretation of the bible) over other religions (pro-slavery Christians in the south and their interpretation of the bible). 89 Is Perry saying that
it is permissible to rely on such arguments today, but it would not have been
moral to do so in 1860? In 1960?90
Even today, some people might be troubled by policy choices made on
the basis of religious arguments regarding the sacred nature of human life.
For example, Perry acknowledges that his position supports the inclusion of
religious arguments made by religious anti-abortionists, and justifies, as a
matter of constitutional and political morality, reliance on such arguments in
passing laws outlawing abortion. 91 Waiting in the wings are other "human
worth" controversies involving infanticide, euthanasia, physician assisted
suicide, and human genetic research (some, in fact, have already taken the
stage). It seems rather thin to suggest that reliance on religious arguments
seeking to prohibit any one of these activities is both constitutional and
moral because it is based on a "universal and noncontroversial" religious
proposition regarding the sacred nature of human life. In fact, it is not
clear to me how these controversies are distinguishable in any relevant way
from the debate over the morality of abortion. It is not that I disagree with
Perry here; I do think he underestimates the controversial nature of his

proposition.

69.
See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting slaves as three-fifths of a person), amended by
U.S. CONST. amends. XIV & XVI; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (protecting the import of slaves),
amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (counting slaves as three87 PERRY, supra note 1, at
88

fifths of a person), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60

U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
89 For a discussion of pro-slavery Christianity and its role in the antebellum South, see
Lash, supra note 14, at 1136-41.
90 It may be that principles of political morality should apply only in those societies that
have committed themselves to the political requirements of a liberal democracy. See, e.g.,
RAwLS, supra note 6, at 249 (arguing that, given the historical conditions, it was not unreasonable for abolitionists to rely on nonpublic reasons in order to bring about a well-ordered and just
society). This position would explain why arguments appropriate in one society or period of
history are impermissible in another. On the other hand, this approach seems to create a situation in which purely religious arguments are permitted in order to bring about a just societybut thereafter are only conditionally allowed in political debate (if allowed at all). Not only is
this position disingenuous, at the very least, this argument leaves obscure how we know when
purely religious arguments are (once again) necessary to bring about a more just society.
91 Perry argues that, should the government choose to outlaw abortion, "it would not have
to rely on a religious argument about the requirements of human well-being." Perry, supra note
1, at 70. Such laws would require reliance on the religious argument regarding the sacredness of
all human beings. See id. at 70-71.
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C. Religious Arguments Regarding Human Well-being
Arguments regarding human well-being address "what must not be done
to, or what must be done for, a human being (including oneself) if she is to
flourish."92 According to Perry, no religious argument about requirements of
human well-being is sufficiently strong to ground a political choice, unless a
persuasive secular argument reaches the same conclusion about the requirements of human well-being. 93 Unbelievers would not be persuaded by such
arguments. Even religious believers, according to Perry, should doubt the
validity of religious arguments that cannot be supported by a persuasive secular argument: Most religious arguments about human well-being rely, at least
in part, "on a claim about what God has revealed, ' 94 and revelation is both
unreliable and subject to self-deception. 95 Along these lines, Perry asserts
that:
Given the demonstrated, ubiquitous human propensity to be mistaken and even to deceive oneself about what God has revealed, the
absence of a persuasive secular argument in support of a claim
about the requirements of human well-being fairly supports a presumption that the claim is probably false, that it is probably
the de96
fective yield of that demonstrated human propensity.
Thus, requiring religious believers to rely on religious arguments regarding
human well-being only when there also exists a persuasive secular rationale
97
acts as a check on inherently unreliable religious revelation.
In fact, Perry argues that religious believers should enter political debates regarding human well-being only if they are willing to accept the possibility that they themselves may be wrong in their interpretation of God's
92
93

Id. at 72.
See id. at 73. Perry's approach to the morality of relying on religious arguments regard-

ing human well-being tracks his general test for determining whether a political choice violates
the nonestablishment norm. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Perry, however, distin-

guishes religious arguments regarding human well-being from religious arguments regarding
who is a human being, in particular whether a fetus is a human being in the relevant sense. See
PERRY, supra note 1, at 79. Because plausible secular arguments regarding abortion can be
made, Perry does not believe it is necessary to separately analyze this third type of religious

argument. See id. ("As a practical matter, the question seems unimportant."). I am not so sure
the question can be avoided in an age confronting serious policy questions involving both the
end of life (euthanasia, physician assisted suicide, etc.), and the beginning of life (genetic engi-

neering, cloning, growing and harvesting organs, etc.).
94 PERRY, supra note 1, at 73.
95 See id. at 74.
96 Id. at 75. Perry asserts that his argument follows traditional Roman Catholic reliance
on Natural Reason-the idea that no fundamental truth about human well-being is unavailable
to religious nonbelievers. See id. at 74-75. Perry also cites with approval Robert Audi, who

argues that secular arguments regarding moral principles may be better because religious arguments are "more subject than [secular arguments regarding human well-being] to extraneous
cultural influences, most vulnerable to misinterpretation of texts or their sheer corruption across
time and translation, and more liable to bias stemming from political or other nonreligious
aims." Id. at 75 (citing Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic

Society, 30
97

SAN

DIEGO L. Rv. 667, 699 n.5 (1993)).

With the exception of religious arguments regarding human worth. See supraPart H.B.

1116

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol 65:1100

will.98 Notions of infallibility, Perry argues, are antithetical to moral political
debate. 99 Although this may result in the exclusion of some religious arguments from public policy debates, Perry argues the effect will be minimal:
It does not affect purely religious arguments regarding human worth, a°° and
the restriction does not apply to religious arguments that are based on moral
insights gained by religious traditions over time-at least to the extent that
such arguments are not presented as divine revelation or infallible
doctrine.101
It is significant, though understandable, that, by the end of his discus-

sion, Perry has moved away from the narrower point regarding private reliance on religious arguments in making a political choice, and back to a
discussion regarding the morality of public expression of sectarian religious
arguments. This "leakage" between Perry's categories seems unavoidable.

In the earlier section, Perry argues that it is morally permissible (if not always
1°2
advisable) to present any and all religious arguments in public debate.
Only some religious arguments regarding human well-being (those accompanied by a persuasive secular rationale), however, may morally and constitutionally be the basis for political decisionmaking. 10 3 But, if a persuasive
secular rationale exists, surely it is immoral to withhold that rationale in public debate. Thus, Perry's conclusion regarding private decisionmaking seems
to imply that public religious arguments regarding human well-being should
104
be accompanied (perhaps in due course) by a persuasive secular rationale.
98 See PERRY, supra note 1, at 76. Although Perry believes it might be best for legislators
and others to rely only on persuasive secular arguments, he concedes that such a requirement
would be unrealistic; trying to determine what choice a religious believer would make absent
her religious faith is "perilous at best and would probably be, as often as not, self-deceiving and
self serving." Id. at 77. Instead, "[tihe question she should ask herself is whether, in addition to
the religious argument she accepts, she finds persuasive a secular argument that reaches the
same conclusion about the requirements of human well-being." Id.
99 Assuming a privileged or infallible position in political debate is likely to strike nonbelievers-and even some members of that faith-as "little more than hubristic and self-serving
stratagems." Id. at 76.

100 See supra Part II.B.

101 See PERRY, supra note 1, at 80. Moral insight regarding the requirements of human
well-being "as the yield of the lived experience of an historically extended human community,
might well have a resonance and indeed an authority that extends far beyond just those who
accept the tradition's religious claims." Id. (emphasis omitted). Here, Perry cites theologian
James Burtchaell for the proposition that religious moral insight need not be revelational or even
theological. See id. at 81-82 (citing James Tunstead Burtchaell, The Sources of Conscience, 13
NOTRE DAME MAG. 20, 20-21 (Winter 1984-85)). For example, one need not be Hindu to be
impressed by Mohatma Gandhi's moral vision, nor need one be Jewish to appreciate the moral
insights of the Jewish Bible, nor Christian to find compelling the Gospel vision of what it means
to be human. See id. at 81. Thus, according to Perry, as long as religious moral insights are
presented as doing no more than deepening "our understanding of man as he essentially is,"
there is no reason to place restrictions on the use of such arguments in public debate. See id. at
82 (citing Basil Mitchell, Should Law be Christian, LAW & JUST., No. 96/97 1988, at 21).
102 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
103 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
104 When Perry states that religious arguments regarding human well-being must be supportable by persuasive secular arguments that reach the same conclusion, it is not clear whether
he believes that both arguments should be presented at or near the same time. John Rawls, for
example, believes that publicly accessible arguments should follow in "due course." See RAWLS,
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In the end, despite his claims to the contrary, Perry advocates a position
that seems substantially less inclusive of religious arguments than the most
recent theories of John Rawls. Rawls applies his ideal of public reason to all
comprehensive beliefs-both secular and religious; 10 5 Perry's restriction
bears upon only religious arguments. Rawls further limits his theory to debates involving fundamental issues of justice, or what he calls "constitutional
essentials."' 1 6 Perry's theory, on the other hand, includes any religious argument involving an issue of human well-being-a category, one imagines, that
embraces much more than mere "constitutional essentials." Finally, Rawls
appears to permit purely religious arguments regarding constitutional essentials, even in the absence of a sufficient secular rationale, as long as the religious believer seriously weighs the value of making such an argument against
its social costs. 10 7 Perry, however, concludes that some purely religious arguments are never justified-those regarding human well-being-if unsupported by sufficient secular rationales.
III.

Summary and Conclusion

Although religiously conservative evangelicals may find encouragement
in Perry's rejection of the exclusionary arguments of scholars like Robert
Audi, 08 Richard Rorty,10 9 and Bruce Ackerman, 110 they may have a hard
time understanding why, under Perry's own theory, they should accept his
limits on religious arguments regarding human well-being. Certainly, even
religious believers can agree that religious arguments are often driven by mistaken or self-serving reasoning. But, as Perry himself recognizes at an earlier
point in his book, the same may likely be true about secular reasoning."' In
a century that has seen secular political purges, gulags, nationalistic ethnic
cleansing, and the terrifying logic of eugenics, it is not clear to me why a
religious believer would (or should) agree to give secular moral reasoning
privileged status.112 Nor would all religious believers agree with Perry that
supra note 6, at Ii. Perry might require nothing more than that the religious person arrive at the

conclusion that a persuasive secular argument exists before proceeding to offer (and only offer) a
religious argument. However, once the believer has concluded that an argument exists support-

ing their position in terms accessible to the nonbeliever, there would seem to be no good reason
to withhold that argument and present only the religious one-which, by definition, the nonbeliever cannot accept.
105 See RAwLS, supra note 6, at xviii.

106 Id. at 227. Constitutional essentials include: 1) questions involving fundamental principles specifying the general structure of government and the political process; and 2) the equal
basic rights and liberties of citizens. See id.
107 See id. at 250 (discussing the situation facing the abolitionists).
108 See, e.g., Audi, supra note 4, at 284.
109 See, e.g., Rorty, supra note 5, at 2.

110 See, e.g., AccER1A, supra note 5, at 10-11.
111 See PERRY, supranote 1, at 46,47-48,53-54 ("[R]eligiously based moral discourse is not
necessarily more sectarian than secular moral discourse.").
112 According to David Smolin, such an approach is an "irrational attempt to elevate the
human mind above the divine mind." David Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict
in a PostmodernAmerica: A Response to ProfessorPerry, 76 IowA L. Rtv. 1067, 1086 (1991)
[hereinafter, Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict]. Smolin has argued that "even
our intellectual capacities have been distorted by the effects of sin. The pervasive effects of sin
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arguments based on revelation are necessarily "inaccessible" to nonbelievers.
According to evangelical scholar David Smolin, "[t]he very nature of scriptural religions like Christianity, Judaism and Islam is that they posit an ex1 13
tremely public and accessible revelation of God."'
In fact, Perry's defense of placing restrictions on religious arguments regarding human well-being highlights the gap between religious liberals like
Perry and religious conservatives like Smolin. Perry maintains that his argument is in line with the Christian evangelical doctrine of the Fall of Man;
because the Fall affects man's secular and religious reasoning, there is no
reason to give religious reasoning priority.1 14 Conservative Christians, of
course, would respond that either Scripture or Church tradition corrects for
each individual's fallen nature and tilts the scales in favor of revelation or
magisterium over secular moral investigation. Perry, however, rejects both
Scripture and tradition as adequate sources of information regarding God's
will for humanity. In fact, Perry argues that reasoning from secular premises
is more likely to arrive at correct conclusions regarding the will of God than
religious reasoning because of the corrupt nature of church tradition and sacred texts like the Bible. 115 Such arguments, to put it mildly, are unlikely to
persuade religious conservatives.
The "ecumenical dialogue" envisioned by Perry is far removed from the
most inflammatory-and probably the most effective-form of religiouspolitical rhetoric. This may be intentional, but whatever is gained in terms of
social unity comes at the cost of religiously inspired moral urgency. After all,
we are not just talking about religious opposition to abortion or homosexual
sexual conduct, we are also talking about religious opposition to slaveryopposition that Perry concedes is inherently religious. 116 Perry justifies only
noncontroversial forms of religious argument (those based on universally accepted ideas regarding the sacred nature of human life) or religious arguments regarding human well-being essentially scrubbed clean of clearly
suggest that creation, human nature, and human reason are often unreliable means for knowing
the law of God .... Thus, scripture and Christian tradition have come to have a priority among
the sources of... God's will." David M. Smolin, The Enforcement of NaturalLaw By the State:
A Response to Professor Calhoun, 16 U. DAYTON L. Rnv. 381, 391-92 (1991).
113 Smolin, Regulating Religious and CulturalConflict, supra note 112, at 1085-86. As Kent
Greenawalt has pointed out, "from this Christian perspective, the main barrier to acceptance of
Christianity is not insufficient understanding but a failure of will stemming from sinful human
nature." GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 97.
114 See PERRY, supra note 1, at 99-101.
115 See id. at 99-100. According to John Robinson, the writers of the Gospel epistles did not
"adequately distinguish" their own culture
from the Gospel message they handed down to us. The result is that as we modems
come to doubt the moral propriety of patriarchalism, for example, we find that we
cannot resolve that doubt by reference to scripture and tradition. They are both
influenced by the same patriarchalism that we are questioning, and yet the mode of
that influence is such that we would be supremely unwise to regard either Scripture
or tradition as validating it for us.
Id. at 100 (quoting John H. Robinson, Church, State, and Sex, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 5 (1995)).

116 See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text ("sacred human life" as a religious
argument).
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identifiable religious content, and phrased in terms identifiably human, not
divine. But to remove, or "civilize," the religious voice whenever it is based
on controversial religious assumptions seems to me to remove what is simultaneously most valuable and most dangerous about religious rhetoric. "Dogmatic" religious arguments may, of course, lead to holy wars, crusades, and

117
the burning of heretics. But they may also lead to the abolition of slavery,
prod a national conscience into passing civil rights legislation, or shame us
into consideration of the poor, the infirm, and the untouchable. 118 In other
words, religious rhetoric is capable of radical evil and radical good. For every
William Lloyd Garrison 1 9 there is a John Brown. 120 Nor is there any a priori
method to distinguish a modem day Garrison from a modem day Brown.
How do we know ahead of time what our conclusions one hundred years
from now will be regarding justice (or, for that matter, regarding the relationship between sex and procreation) one hundred years from now? How can
we determine who, years from now, will be revered as a prophet ahead of her
time and who derided as a dangerous lunatic? We cannot know.
In the end, the critical and irreplaceable role of the religious voice in
politics is to disrupt our smug assumption that "'We the People of the United
States' now living" are the beginning and end of all things. No doubt, the
costs of tolerating the voice of the prophet are substantial. It makes sense to
explore both legal and moral restraints on any rhetoric that threatens so
much division, so much violence. But to favor silencing that voice altogether
on any particular matter is to flatter ourselves that we have reached the ideal
society-that on this subject there is no legitimate transcendent critique of
21
who we are and what we do. Such flattery, however, will get us nowhere.

117 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 250.

118 See David M. Smolin, Cracks in the MirroredPrison: An Evangelical Critique of SecularistAcademic and JudicialMyths Regarding the Relationship of Religion and American Politics,
29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1487, 1501 (1996) (arguing that sectarian religious arguments in the public
square are necessary if people are going to be motivated to "pay the costs of doing what is
right").
119 On July 4th, 1854, radical abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison publicly burned a copy of
the United States Constitution while denouncing it as "a covenant with death, and an agreement
with hell." DocumENTs OF UPHEAVAL: SE ECTIONS FROM WILLIAM LLOYD GAR,.RIsON's THE
LIBERATOR, 1831-1865, at 216 (Truman Nelson ed., 1966).
120 At his trial, John Brown stated:
This Court acknowledges, too, as I suppose, the validity of the law of God. I see a
book kissed, which I suppose to be the Bible, or at least the New Testament, which
teaches me that all things whatsoever I would that men should do to me, I should
do even so to them. It teaches me further to remember them that are in bonds as
bound with them. I endeavored to act up to that instruction. I say I am yet too
young to understand that God is any respecter of persons. I believe that to have
interfered as I have done, as I have always freely admitted I have done in behalf of
His despised poor, is no wrong, but right. Now, if it is deemed necessary that I
should forfeit my life for the furtherance of the ends of justice, and mingle my
blood further with the blood of my children and with the blood of millions in this
slave country whose rights are disregarded by wicked, cruel, and unjust enactments,
I say let it be done.
Statement of John Brown, reprinted in Robert A. Ferguson, Story and Transcriptionin the Trial
of John Brown, 6 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 37, 68-69 (1994).
121 Mark Tushnet writes:
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When faced with an issue of transcendent importance-slavery in the nineteenth
century, or abortion (for some) in the twentieth-, people can reasonably say,
"Getting the right answer to this question is more important than preserving a stable social order in which injustice prevails." Or, as Lincoln put it in his Second
Inaugural Address, "Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war
rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it
perish. And the war came."
Mark Tushnet, The ConstitutionalLaw of Religion Outside the Courts (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).

